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Abstract 
 
The authors revisit the troubling discourse surrounding the diagnosis of dementia. A critique of 
the predominant words and images in health care literature, public discourse, and policy is con-
sidered from multiple angles. The authors link the dominant words and images with a form of 
inter-relational violence. Contrary images grounded in research and experience offer a different 
view of what it is like to live with a diagnosis of dementia—a view that is life-affirming and 
based in relationality and possibility. Concepts of embodied selfhood and knowing other-wise 
are portrayed as doorways to transforming a discourse of violence toward a discourse of compas-
sion and ethical relating. 
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In our experience, the diagnosis of dementia, 
especially Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), in 
Western society continues to initiate a total-
izing process involving suffering, discrimi-
nation, isolation, and, in many situations a 
violence of inter-relating. Our purpose in 
this paper are two-fold. First, we will re-visit 
the troubling relationship between the domi-
nant medical discourse and consequences 
for persons with dementia, family care part-
ners, and healthcare workers. Second, we 
will build on the notions of relationality 
(Dupuis et al., 2012a; Greenwood, Loewen-
thal, & Rose, 2002), embodied selfhood 
(Kontos, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2012; Kontos 
and Naglie, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) and know-
ing other-wise (Olthuis, 1997) in order to 
heighten attention to the ethical responsibili-
ties we all have to persons with dementia. 
To begin, we show how the discourse sur-
rounding dementia is in large part responsi-
ble for reproducing the violent and othering 
(Olthuis, 1997, 2000a, 200b) processes that 
accompany the label of dementia and dis-
close how this discourse imposes a suffering 
of personhood that has yet to be deterred. 
An alternative discourse of possibility and 
knowing other-wise (Olthuis, 1997, 2000a, 
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2000b) is presented as a viable option to 
shift societal and professional assumptions 
and prejudices. 
 
We concur with several other authors 
(see for e.g., Dupuis, Wiersma, & Loiselle, 
2012b; Herskovits, 1995; Mintz, 1992; Sa-
bat, Johnson, Swarbrick, & Keady, 2011) 
that the dominant discourse of dementia, 
coupled with the medicalization of aging, 
reproduces dementia and human suffering 
through a totalizing disregard for another’s 
embodied personhood and the relationships 
that sustain one’s sense of self-with-other. 
Critical scholars, such as Behuniak (2011) 
who tackled the social construction of per-
sons with dementia as the walking dead or 
zombies, Kontos (2004) who challenges the 
cognitive foundation of personhood, and 
Dupuis et al. (2011, 2012a, 2012c) consist-
ently dialogues with, and learns from, per-
sons diagnosed with dementia and their fam-
ilies, and remind us of the power of words 
and how words shape actions in society. 
Language matters and, when used in certain 
ways, can be dangerous and harmful. Lan-
guage shapes the way we see and frame the 
world. “What is named [is] noticed; what is 
not named is unlikely to be seen” (Davis, 
Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2008, p. 15). Thus, 
language has a profound impact on how we 
come to understand things, shaping our as-
sumptions and perceptions. These assump-
tions influence how we act in different situa-
tions and how we are with others (Davis et 
al., 2008; Mintz, 1992). The language sur-
rounding dementia has serious implications 
for how we see and engage with persons di-
agnosed with some form of dementia, espe-
cially Azheimer’s Disease (Dupuis et al., 
2011, 2012b; Jonas-Simpson et al., 2012; 
Mitchell et al., 2011; Mitchell, Dupuis, & 
Jonas-Simpson, 2011; Naue & Kroll, 2008; 
Sabat et al., 2011). One of the most serious 
issues relates to how personhood of those 
diagnosed with dementia is represented. 
 
In this paper, we bring forth images and 
representations from the health and lay liter-
ature about what it is like to live with de-
mentia. We review what some outsiders 
think it is like to live with dementia and 
consider the dominant discourse that sur-
rounds the dementia diagnosis. Serious at-
tempts to counter the dominant discourse are 
considered as are the experiences of stigma 
from persons living with dementia. Our per-
sonal insights and understandings as in-
formed by experience and complexity sci-
ence are considered before introducing the 
idea of knowing other-wise and the call for 
new discourses based in hope and possibility. 
 
Dementia and Personhood 
 
What are the images of personhood for those 
diagnosed with dementia? Popular literature 
and social media portray frightening images 
of AD. In 2004, a published book titled, 
Death in Slow Motion: A Memoir of a 
Daughter, Her Mother, and the Beast Called 
Alzheimer's (Cooney) captures the gruesome 
portrayal of a medical diagnosis. The Cana-
dian newspaper, the Globe and Mail, ran a 
story called Doomed from Birth to Death (A. 
Mcilroy, May 7, 2007) about a woman born 
with Down’s Syndrome, who later devel-
oped AD. Other titles, such as The Living 
Dead: Alzheimer’s in America (Lushin, 
1990) and That Cranky Old Cat May Have 
Alzheimer’s (Fujita, 2012) layer on the fear-
ful and negative messages about dementia. 
These images, coupled as they usually are 
with the tragedy discourse of being doomed, 
gutted, ravaged, taken over by a beast, and 
turned into the living dead, perpetuate a 
deep and pernicious fear of, and disregard 
for, persons with dementia.  
 
Legal and medical scholars have con-
tributed to questioning the personhood of 
those diagnosed with dementia. Ponder the 
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views of medical philosopher Brock (1988) 
from his consideration of justice and demen-
tia.  
 
I believe that the severely demented, 
while of course remaining members of 
the human species, approach more close-
ly the conditions of animals than normal 
adult humans in their psychological ca-
pacities. In some respects the severely 
demented are even worse off than ani-
mals such as dogs and horses who have a 
capacity for integrated and goal directed 
behavior that the severely demented sub-
stantially lack. The dementia that de-
stroys memory…destroys a sense of per-
sonal identity across time and hence they 
lack personhood. (p. 87) 
 
Twenty years later, an ethicist and advisor to 
the British government suggested that per-
sons with dementia may have a moral duty 
to die, especially if they are wasting human 
and fiscal resources (Malpas, 2009). Debates 
continue over issues of personhood, human 
rights, and the meaning and awareness of 
self. 
 
The assumed loss of self with cognitive 
impairment can be traced to the 17thcentury 
rise of the “modern self” where the self and 
brain became consubstantial, or identical in 
substance (Kontos, 2004; Kontos & Naglie, 
2009). This ideology laid the foundation for 
the modern view of person as autonomous, 
rational, and cognitively determined. The 
equality of brain and self(hood) underpins 
the predominant biomedical approach of at-
tributing personhood to a body part, the 
brain, and human actions to be disease-
based behaviours (Dupuis et al., 2012b). We 
deeply appreciate the valued work of health 
professionals, but the practice of dividing 
humans and reducing human expressions 
and experiences to bodily functions and be-
haviours spread through multiple health care 
disciplines in their languages, activities, and 
practice protocols. This spreading, a kind of 
colonization, also seeps into policies and 
government regulations in the languages and 
prescriptive codes used to assess quality and 
compliance. Finally, the seepage penetrates 
societal and marketing realms in its relent-
less domination, one that objectifies and 
problematizes lived experiences such as ag-
ing (Estes & Binney, 1989; Kaufman, Shim, 
& Russ, 2004) and grieving, to name just 
two.  
 
Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) described 
the interdependent relationships between 
language/discourse, activities/practice, and 
social relationships/organisation in the pro-
cess of institutionalization. The language we 
use, over time, gradually becomes institu-
tionalized into accepted patterns of dis-
course, which shape our activities and prac-
tices (i.e., how we act) and our social rela-
tionships and organization (e.g., how we re-
late). These interdependent processes are 
reflected in Figure 1. The intermingling and 
interpenetration of values, words, and ac-
tions are undeniable. As Olthuis (1997) not-
ed, “Knowledges cannot be and never were 
neutral, dispassionate, disinterested” (p. 2).    
 
There is an overabundance of compel-
ling examples about how medical coloniza-
tion and its discourse has infiltrated human 
Mitchell et al.  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2013 Article 5    4 
life and impacted human lives, especially for 
persons living with dementia (Dupuis et al., 
2012b; Herskovits, 1995; Sabat & Harré, 
1994; Sabat et al., 2011). Health profession-
als contribute to human health and well-
being in many ways, but the consequences 
of biomedical colonization perpetuate de-
humanized healthcare for persons with de-
mentia -  evidenced by such practices as in-
fantilization, intimidation, stigmatization, 
and objectification (Herskovits, 1995; Kit-
wood, 1997; Mitchell, Dupuis, & Jonas-
Simpson, 2011; Sabat et al., 2011). Policy 
documents and public health forecasters fuel 
this fear by conjuring up images of the epi-
demic taking over, the tsunami heading our 
way, the rising tide of dementia. In market-
ing with techniques that highlight the most 
debilitating, demeaning, and despairing fears 
of Alzheimer’s disease and related demen-
tias – the tragedy of it is emphasized and 
fear is commanded before compassion or 
even empathy.  
 
Healthcare journals and texts represent 
persons diagnosed with dementia as dements, 
victims, diseased, disoriented, departing, 
devoid, irrational, disruptive, and uncon-
trolled. Consider these titles: “Dementia and 
the Phenomenon of Social Death” (Sweeting 
& Gilhooly, 1997) and “Beyond appearanc-
es: Caring in the land of the living dead” 
(Dunkle, 1995). Even authors advocating for 
revolutionary change in dementia care prac-
tices and policies, do not step away from the 
medical discourse. Consider the following 
description from authors advocating for so-
cial justice in dementia care (Dilworth-
Anderson, Pierre, & Hilliard, 2012). 
 
Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive 
brain disease that destroys brain cells, 
causing problems with memory, thinking, 
and behavior, which affects the ability to 
work, socialize, and care for oneself. As 
the disease progresses, Alzheimer’s pa-
tients increasingly need assistance with 
basic activities of daily living (ADLs), 
such as eating and dressing as well as 
functions that enable them to live inde-
pendently, including shopping and man-
aging money (i.e., instrumental activities 
of daily living [IADLs]). In the final 
stages of the disease, patients require 24-
hour care. (p. 28) 
 
Although these authors make an impas-
sioned case for social justice in care and ser-
vice for persons with dementia, and even 
though they address stigma and stereotype 
as forms of social injustice, they do not cri-
tique the medical discourse that strongly 
contributes to the stigma and stereotype of 
dementia.  
 
Once diagnosed with dementia, persons 
and their feelings, actions, and expressions 
become symptoms within a problematized 
field of possibility. If persons with dementia 
express feeling healthy and well, they are 
judged as being in denial. If they are having 
trouble remembering details but fill in the 
gaps to save face, they are said to be con-
fabulating. If they get angry with the way in 
which health workers are providing care, 
then they are labeled as aggressive and may 
end up being restrained and isolated. Other 
scholars have also noted this totalizing pro-
cess of labeling and problematizing that en-
gulfs a person’s entire life and relationships 
with others (see for example, Dupuis et al., 
2011, 2012b, Herskovits, 1995; Jonas-
Simpson et al., 2012; Sabat et al., 2011; 
Whitehouse, 2008). Fazio and his colleagues 
(1999) describe the process of dehumaniza-
tion in dementia that starts with predominant 
discourses and labeling and ends with the 
complete objectification that regards persons 
as no more than stages of disease and deficit. 
This dehumanizing process creates suffering 
by devaluing persons and rupturing relations 
with the social world; it is a process that 
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damages one’s sense of self, leading ulti-
mately to the loss of selfhood that is so 
widely thought to be caused by neuropathol-
ogy. 
 
Alarmingly, the medical colonization 
has seeped into the social and personal fab-
rics of contemporary society. The messages 
are clear and the impact profound. If we all 
live long enough, the odds are that we too 
will be diagnosed with dementia. There are 
strong advocates for diagnosing pre-
dementia so that drugs can be started early 
but this raises ethical concerns and complex-
ities (see Leuzy & Gauthier, 2012). Would 
we not all have pre-dementia? Medications 
too can be a form of violence—to both the 
physical body and one’s selfhood and rela-
tionships. Moynihan and Cassels (2008) 
claim that the drug companies are selling 
sickness and making a fortune doing it. And, 
their predominant marketing tool is fear—
fear that we too will get dementia, or de-
pression, or some other dysfunction and be-
come like them (Herskovits, 1995). But are 
we not already like them? “Do we not all 
have memory loss?” (Basting, 2009). Bast-
ing helps us see that forgetting is an aspect 
of being human. We all forget but it is only 
pathologized with a diagnosis of dementia. 
If we are the ones contributing to the social 
construction of Alzheimer’s Disease, is this 
not irrational and degrading to humanity? 
 
In our experiences, many family care 
partners also express the othering discourse 
about their parents or partners. Families 
have expressed to us that they do not believe 
there is anything left of their loved one - no 
feelings, no relationship, just a desire to get 
them in a home (see for example, Dupuis et 
al., 2011). This is consistent with a study of 
more than 100 caregivers for family mem-
bers in Australia. Authors reported that less 
than 50 percent of participants believed life 
with dementia was worth living and many 
considered the person socially dead and 
thought about or wished for the person’s 
physical death (Sweeting & Gilhooly, 1997). 
And the medical colonization of old age and 
dementia is seen in the everydayness of life 
for many older persons residing in long term 
care homes, in our protocols and standards, 
our assessments, and policies. Wiersma and 
Dupuis, as an example, described five so-
cialization processes of mechanical and reg-
ulatory procedures -- placing the body, de-
fining the body, focusing on the body, man-
aging the body, and relating to the body – 
used in long-term care homes to create “in-
stitutionalized bodies” or what Foucault 
(1977) termed “docile bodies”. Colonization 
is also seen in these settings in the overuse 
of medication, the use of geri-chairs, side 
rails and other physical restraints, in the vio-
lence of policies and surveillance that leave 
many direct care providers with moral resi-
due (Webster & Baylis, 2000), fear, and 
guilt of knowing that health care should look 
a lot different than what is being delivered in 
Canada (Kontos, Miller, Mitchell, & Cott, 
2011; McGilton, Sidani, Boscart, Guruge, & 
Brown, 2012). 
 
 Long-term care policies do not help. As 
an example, the Ontario Long Term care Act 
(2007, 2011) is a lengthy document with 
hundreds of rules and expectations. Many 
relate to the facility, food preparation, plans 
of care, assessments, and so on. Neither the 
importance of personhood nor the idea of 
quality relationships are addressed in the Act, 
except for definitions of abuse that attempt 
to protect residents. However, even then, 
and we quote: “physical abuse does not in-
clude the use of force that is appropriate to 
the provision of care or assisting a resident 
with activities of daily living, unless the 
force used is excessive in the circumstances” 
(p. 1). It is extremely troubling to realize 
that the imposed suffering for persons with 
dementia in our health care system that is 
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unnecessary, unethical, and cruel is not ad-
dressed. The Act focuses on task completion, 
regulation, compliance, assessment, loga-
rithms, evidence, and enforcement. This re-
ality coupled with narrative accounts from 
those who provide direct care (see for ex-
ample, DeForge, van Wyk, Hall, & Salmoni, 
2011; Kontos, et al., 2011) paint a dark, and 
indeed alarming picture of how far we are 
from providing compassionate and loving 
care based in quality relationships. And oth-
er authors have raised similar concerns 
about the absence of relationships in our ev-
idence-based world of healthcare (Mitchell, 
in press; Slife & Wiggins, 2009). It is our 
contention that we must shift this violent 
approach to the care of persons, and espe-
cially those with dementia. We must rebel 
against the suffering we are inflicting on 
others and the suffering it creates in our own 
lives (Malpas, 2012). Other countries, such 
as Denmark, have a totally different ap-
proach to dementia care that is far more hu-
manistic and relational. A recent CBC pro-
duction with leaders in dementia care in a 
Denmark facility reported that instances of 
problem outbursts were very rare and when 
they occurred, were considered a failure of 
relationship, not a disease process (Wells, 
2012).  
 
We would be remiss to not address the 
complex realities and losses that do accom-
pany the diagnoses of dementia for individ-
ual persons and those closest to them. There 
are deep losses of familiar patterns, routines, 
ways of relating, and shared remembrances. 
Families often describe feeling trapped and 
fearful of the realities they see unfolding - 
realities that can increase isolation, loss of 
friendships, stress, and moments of sheer 
frustration. But, there is also the reality that 
the person with dementia is still an embod-
ied being who expresses selfhood and de-
sires, suffering and joy. Our concern is that 
the losses experienced are far more profound 
when experienced within a totalizing culture 
that stigmatizes aging and dementia through 
the tragedy discourse and leads to dehuman-
izing practices such as objectification, ex-
clusion, silencing and so forth. What would 
it mean to persons and families experiencing 
these realities and losses if their communi-
ties embraced difference and supported per-
sonhood and inclusion? For those of us who 
are involved in the care of persons with de-
mentia, we have opportunities and obliga-
tions to try to make things more humane and 
compassionate, to work towards the creation 
of communities in which “all kinds of meth-
ods create all kinds of situations in which 
each of us finds relationships where our gifts 
are recognized and magnified” (McKnight, 
2005, p. 117).   
 
Countering the Dominant View: Calls for 
Dignity and Relationality 
 
Some scholars have endeavoured “to restore 
dignity and resuscitate the humanity of indi-
viduals diagnosed with Alzheimer’s” (Her-
skovits, 1995, p. 154) by focusing on the 
subjective experience of dementia, the na-
ture of personhood and the self, and the so-
cio-cultural context of disease definition, 
rather than on neuro-psychological deficits 
(see for example, Dupuis et al., 2011, 2012a, 
2012c; Jonas-Simpson & Mitchell, 2005; 
Kitwood, 1995, 1997; Kontos, 2005, 2012; 
Naue & Kroll, 2008; Sabat et al., 2011; Sa-
bat & Harré, 1994). The importance of Tom 
Kitwood’s (1995, 1997) work cannot be 
overestimated in terms of the pioneering 
work he did in the area of personhood and 
dementia. Kitwood began with the assump-
tion that the loss of self commonly associat-
ed with dementia was due more to a failure 
of understanding and care than to a structur-
al failure of the brain. Focusing on the social 
environment of care, Kitwood described a 
host of ways in which persons with demen-
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tia are depersonalized, invalidated, and 
treated as dysfunctional. 
 
Our individual and collective efforts 
have focused on a re-visioning of the self in 
Alzheimer’s disease and we strongly chal-
lenge the assumption that the loss of self is a 
direct consequence of a degenerative pro-
cess in nervous tissue. Like others (see for 
example, Herskovits, 1995; Kitwood, 1995, 
1997; Sabat et al., 2011), we purport that the 
debasement of personhood is more likely 
affiliated with the ways persons relate with 
those diagnosed with dementia. There is lit-
tle agreement on what the diagnosis of de-
mentia means beyond the neuropathology 
and there is remarkable diversity in how 
neuropathology is manifested in individual 
lives and patterns of living (Herskovits, 
1995; Whitehouse, 2012). Further, neurolo-
gists now indicate that even persons who 
have the brain pathology, may not develop 
the symptoms of dementia (Black, 2013). In 
our re-visioning efforts, we have argued for 
an expansion of the discourse on selfhood in 
dementia to include embodied self-
expression (Kontos, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2012; Kontos & Naglie, 2007a, 2007b, 
2009), authentic partnerships, (Dupuis et al., 
2012a), and a focus on the human being and 
his or her lived experiences and quality of 
life (Jonas-Simpson & Mitchell, 2005; 
Mitchell, Dupuis, & Jonas-Simpson, 2011).  
 
Based on empirical research with per-
sons with moderate-severe cognitive im-
pairment, Kontos (2004, 2005, 2006, 2012) 
and Kontos and Naglie (2007a, 2007b, 
2009) illustrate how the engagement of self-
hood with the world consists primarily in 
their essential corporeality of being-in-the-
world. The expressiveness of persons with 
dementia discloses a cultural particularity 
that is shaped by socialization, but the ex-
pressiveness is always embedded in situa-
tional unities that call forth bodily move-
ment and gestures. These situational and 
embodied expressions of self persist despite 
even severe cognitive impairment. In other 
words, many life patterns and ways of relat-
ing continue to be expressed in the presence 
of dementia because fundamental aspects of 
selfhood are embodied and not defined by 
cognitive function. 
 
Kontos illustrated how persons with se-
vere dementia continue to express them-
selves in significant ways through their bod-
ies as demonstrated in social etiquette, affec-
tion, friendship overtures, concern for ap-
pearance, engagement in religious and artis-
tic practices, expression of physical needs 
and discomforts, aversion to particular foods, 
and dispositions that convey one’s prior vo-
cation (Kontos, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2012; 
Kontos, Miller, & Mitchell, 2010; Kontos & 
Naglie, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). The im-
portance of the body for these expressions is 
powerfully illustrated in the following ex-
ample: a male resident with severe cognitive 
impairment living on an Alzheimer support 
unit who had lost the ability to talk and feed 
himself would hit other residents on the 
head before taking his seat at the table (Kon-
tos & Naglie, 2007). Once a connection was 
made between the fact that he would always 
remove his hat before entering the dining 
room, and that the residents at his table 
whom he would hit were wearing a hat, it 
became clear that his ‘aggressive behaviour’ 
was related to his prior longstanding respect 
for the etiquette of removing one’s hat be-
fore dining. Despite severe cognitive im-
pairment, he still retained the ability to ex-
press himself through nonverbal behaviour.  
 
Another example highlights the intersec-
tions between social class and gender, show-
ing the ways in which embodied selfhood in 
dementia continues to express class habitus 
through habitual manners and gestures, in-
cluding ones in relation to dress. Consider 
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the following observation from an Alz-
heimer support unit in a long-term care fa-
cility. 
 
String of Pearls 
 
Molly’s wheelchair looked enormous 
next to her thin and shriveled body. Her 
legs had severely atrophied leaving a 
seemingly two-dimensional form. Were 
she able to stand, she’d be no more than 
five feet tall. Her face was heavily wrin-
kled but her skin soft, resembling a 
peach. Her hair was uniformly white 
which accentuated her China-blue eyes. 
The back of her hands was the most viv-
id testament to the near century she had 
lived. The skin was thin revealing a net-
work of bones and purple veins. Her 
hands shook as if powered by an invisi-
ble gentle motor.  
 
Despite her withered appearance there 
was an indescribable elegance to her. I 
noticed this in watching Molly as she 
was brought to the dining room. Once 
her wheelchair was positioned at the ta-
ble a bib was fastened around her neck. 
Molly then carefully unfolded her nap-
kin and placed it on her lap. Even though 
the use of the bib made the need for a 
napkin redundant, she nonetheless in-
sisted in observing this table etiquette.  
 
As a Health Care Aide was feeding her, 
cereal dribbled from Molly’s mouth and 
coursed down her chin. When the Health 
Care Aide tried to give her another 
spoonful Molly wrinkled her forehead 
and gently pushed the woman’s hand 
away. Molly then lifted her bib to her 
mouth to wipe the cereal. It was only af-
ter her chin was clean that she accepted 
another spoonful. One might expect in-
difference from a woman who has lost 
the ability to feed herself and yet Mol-
ly’s insistence to adhere to a sense of so-
cial grace and her attention to neatness, 
suggested a strong and continuing pres-
ence.  
 
She closed her eyes slowly and opened 
them again releasing a deep sigh. She 
then looked around the table as if for the 
first time noticing that there were others 
seated with her. She patiently waited to 
make eye contact with each of them to 
acknowledge their presence. Then reach-
ing her wavering hand to the back of her 
neck, she struggled to pull something 
from underneath her bib. Extending her 
arm appeared to cause her pain and dis-
comfort and yet she persisted. Molly 
eventually revealed a string of pearls she 
was wearing that had been covered by 
her bib. She allowed the pearls to pass 
through her long slender perfectly mani-
cured fingers placing them ever so deli-
cately atop her bib. With this simple ges-
ture, Molly emerged from her world of 
decrepitude, incontinence, dementia and 
helplessness. (Kontos, 2006, pp. 197-
198) 
 
Relating with persons with dementia re-
quires recognition and support of the exis-
tential expressiveness of the body in its rela-
tion to the world, and our unique and shared 
socio-cultural ways of being-in-the-world 
(Kontos, 2004). It is our experience, in bear-
ing witness to persons with dementia, that a 
significant amount of suffering is linked 
with the way the tragic and the horror-filled 
words and images, that are common place in 
social and medical literature, get imposed on 
individuals living with dementia. We reflect 
our fears on persons and that fear disrupts 
relationships and opportunities for learning 
and knowing other-wise. In our work with 
families living with dementia (Dupuis et al., 
2012a), one person with dementia described 
her experience in the following way:  
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The person that has the disease are 
sometimes treated like they’re not here 
anymore….I think that’s very bad be-
cause we definitely are still here. And 
we might not have all our capabilities up 
there as we used to have…., We might 
not have great days all the time but 
sometimes we do, and I think that should 
be encouraged and try and make people 
more aware of what goes on with people 
with Alzheimer’s instead of just saying -
- oh they’ve got Alzheimer’s, so I guess 
they’re not with the program anymore…., 
A lot of people I know will just walk by 
me or go the other direction if they see 
me now because they think I’m not the 
same person, which I’m not but I’m still 
here and I can still talk you know. (pp. 
428-429). 
 
Another stated: “Many think it is the disease 
that causes us to withdraw, and to some ex-
tent I believe this is true. But, for many of us, 
we withdraw because we are not provided 
with meaningful opportunities that allow us 
to continue to experience joy, purpose, and 
engagement in life” (Dupuis et al., 2012c, p. 
240). 
 
Persons living with dementia tell us 
about this suffering in their pleas for inclu-
sion, respect, and love: 
 
I want others to know and treat us as if 
we are whole people. We are not half 
full or half empty. We will never, ever 
be a shell of ourselves. Later in the dis-
ease you may knock on my door and I 
may not answer, but that doesn't mean 
I'm not home. I am still Richard. I am 
still wholly and fully a human being. I 
have a right to privacy, dignity, respect, 
and I am still able I believe perhaps in 
ways that you cannot appreciate because 
you don't have dementia. I am still able 
to appreciate myself, to love, and need to 
feel love, I am in short no different than 
you except I have dementia probably of 
the Alzheimer's type. My world is full 
and complete, it fills my mind, it fills my 
days, and it's only the professionals and 
caregivers who remind me of parts of 
my old world that I cannot access, or I'm 
confused about. (Taylor, 2009, p. 47) 
 
Malpas (2012) provokes us to think 
more deeply about suffering and to consider 
that suffering is “a form of distress that is 
directly related to one’s sense of personhood” 
(p.11). Our sense of wholeness and of hope 
is linked with how we and others view and 
judge our personhood. Further, he reminds 
us that we are all interwoven tapestries that 
have formed over time and that continue to 
form through the relationships in now mo-
ments. Our embodied selfhood is an expres-
sion of our relationality with others, with our 
memories, our hopes, and in the places we 
find ourselves. Malpas says that places are 
not “containers but openings of actions and 
movement” (2012, p. 12)  -  places are 
where compassion dwells - where relation-
ships dwell.  
 
Deeper Understandings of Living  
with Dementia 
 
We have many years of work, practice and 
research, with persons who live with demen-
tia and their families. Over this time, we 
have learned some things that are not com-
monly known or acknowledged. First, we 
have seen that dementia is a very dynamic 
and fluid phenomenon that is not, as por-
trayed in the medical and societal discourses, 
a progressive, irreversible decline of one’s 
humanity. In our experience, persons with 
dementia frequently fluctuate - moment to 
moment, day to day, and week to week--
among multiple realities interspersed with 
moments, sometimes shocking moments of 
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clarity in the present now. Even in the latest 
stages of dementia, persons have moments 
or times of clarity that cannot be explained 
by medical science. 
 
Secondly, while our work has taught us 
that persons living with dementia do suffer 
with all the losses and restrictions that typi-
cally accompany the diagnosis of dementia, 
there are also continuing relationships and 
love, persisting patterns of one’s values and 
activities, and moments of humor, joy, and 
peace. Further, there is also new learning 
and emergent possibilities that happen when 
living with dementia. The dominant dis-
course has done a thorough job of portraying 
the loss and decline, the bitter and the tragic. 
And, they have relatively ignored the conti-
nuity, love, and growth that also exists in 
life with a diagnosis of dementia. Some 
people and groups have advantage with the 
dominant discourse - as noted previously, 
political and financial benefits can accom-
pany the tragic portrayals. 
 
The third thing we have learned is that 
people with dementia often live in a world 
without the boundaries of time, place, and 
sometimes person. The boundaries that we 
construct and rely on to separate things like 
time, place, and person shift with dementia, 
the boundaries and barriers become more 
fluid, and less defined such that the person 
before you, is all at once, in the instant of 
the now moment; the person before you is a 
unity of everyone they have been over a life 
span. Past, present and future are experi-
enced together. A woman recalled from one 
of our practices showed this great expanse 
of being as she spoke about being a child 
waiting to sit in her dad’s dentist chair, a 
mother with growing children, an aging and 
loving widow, and an old women waiting to 
be called home. She moved effortlessly in 
her speech from one scene to the next with 
no boundaries or limitations of who she was. 
She was all she had been and all she was 
becoming there in one instant of being and 
expanding. 
 
This phenomenon of disappearing bor-
ders and boundaries may actually herald a 
different and more transformative process of 
human aging. There is at least one theory, 
gerotranscendence (Tornstam, 1996, 2005; 
Tornstam & Tornqvist, 2000), that suggests 
some qualities of aging as described by old-
er people in Sweden, sound something like 
the disappearing boundaries with dementia. 
Older persons in Sweden also describe a 
greater connection with the cosmos; con-
necting and reconnecting with loved ones 
and memories; and redefinitions of time, 
space, life, and death. The point we are try-
ing to make is that the process of aging and 
death is not yet understood; beyond physical 
changes aging is still a mystery. There is the 
possibility that the disappearing boundaries 
of time, place, person currently designated 
as symptoms of brain disease and dementia, 
may in fact be markers of a natural trans-
formation that occurs with aging. Another 
theoretical frame offers important insights 
about the complexity and relationality of 
human being and the universe. 
 
Complexity Science and Relationality 
 
Complexity science with its core idea of re-
lationality is changing how we think about 
and relate with persons with dementia. We 
offer a sketch of how complexity science is 
helping us to understand dementia and then 
we turn to several philosophers who have 
advanced the relational nature of selfhood 
and the opportunities that many health pro-
viders are not yet realizing. We will then 
explore more fully the notion of the rela-
tional self and dementia. 
 
Complexity science is a conceptual 
frame that is informing research and practice 
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in multiple disciplines, including education, 
healthcare, physics, and biology (Uhl-Bien, 
Marian, & Mckelvey, 2007; Westley, Zim-
merman, & Patton, 2006). There are many 
sources of complexity thinking that expand 
understanding of relationality, and possibil-
ity in healthcare and education in particular 
(see for example, Davis & Sumara, 2012; 
Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2008; Doll, 
2012; Doll, Fleener, Truit, & St. Julien, 
2008; Mason, 2008; Ricca, 2012). “The cen-
tral ideas of complexity science are that hu-
man beings and the universe we inhabit are 
living systems, complex adaptive systems 
where mutual process, non-linear change, 
networked connections, and transformations 
continually bring forth new realities and new 
possibilities” (Mitchell, Jonas-Simpson, & 
Cross, 2012). Concepts informed by com-
plexity include: emergent growth, mutuality, 
relationality, non-linearity, and unpredicta-
bility (Ricca, 2012). Complexity science 
helps us see that there are multiple nested 
realities emergent over time that co-exist 
and co-influence through relationships. In 
Figure 2 we offer an image of how nested 
realities might be conceptualized for persons 
living with dementia. 
 
As portrayed in this Figure, a person experi-
ences dementia within a particular family, 
community, culture, and history. People 
have relationships with particular memories 
and dreams, with favourite foods and people, 
with preferred routines, habits, and life pat-
terns, with familiar and often comforting 
music and images. The opportunities to en-
gage with persons with dementia have yet to 
be fully articulated and mobilized into prac-
tice arenas. Indeed, instead of attending to 
ways of relating with persons with dementia, 
in order to preserve and extend their rela-
tional selves, regulatory bodies and clinical 
assessments and protocols are compressing 
all forms of relating and reducing life in 
long term care homes to tasks and duties, 
“bed and body work” (Gubrium, 1975), cre-
ating “institutional bodies” (Wiersma & 
Dupuis, 2010). Indeed, recent literature sug-
gests that some direct care providers who 
care for persons with dementia in long term 
care are either afraid to care for residents, 
fearful of doing what people want them to 
do (DeForge et al., 2011) or workers break 
the rules to do what residents want and live 
with the fear of being caught and punished 
(Kontos et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2. Dementia & Other-Wise: An Emergent Opportunity for Wisdom and Ethical Relating
 
 
 
 
Dementia and the Relational Self 
 
We believe that the consequences of the 
rampant medicalization of later life is a form 
of violence. The violence is expressed and 
lived out through image, language, and ac-
tion in all aspects of our contemporary 
world. We refer again to Figure 2 as a way 
to think about and see this cone of violence 
that dominates dementia care in the West, 
and to also show that there are other alterna-
tives to consider and create. We can attend 
to relationships in all their complexity and 
mystery with persons who live with demen-
tia. The question before us is how to move 
the predominant cone of violence portrayed 
in the diagram toward the opposing realm of 
compassion and knowing other-wise? 
 
Olthuis (1997) proposed that being oth-
er-wise is a commitment to being-with and 
ethics is the responsibility we bear to love 
another. The question of whether one needs 
to love to practice knowing other-wise is 
perhaps debatable. At the very least a core 
of deep compassion for other human beings 
is foundational. Knowing other-wise is an 
opportunity to see difference as potential 
wisdom instead of something to be changed 
or fixed. If we truly believed that difference 
is a space of potential growth, an opportuni-
ty for engagement and expansion of our own 
understanding, then how might we approach 
others? For Olthuis (1997), we would ap-
proach with a humble curiosity, an open and 
non-judgmental invitation for the other to 
reveal who they are in the moment of their 
own unfolding. One can imagine that such 
an approach with persons diagnosed with 
dementia would stand in sharp contrast with 
contemporary practice protocols and policies. 
Post (2000) conquers: “Rather than allowing 
declining mental capacities to divide human-
ity into those who are worthy or unworthy of 
full moral attention, it is better to develop an 
ethics based on the essential unity of human 
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beings and on an assertion of equality de-
spite unlikeness of mind” (p. 5).  
 
We wish to build on the ideas of know-
ing other-wise proposed by Olthuis (1997, 
2000a, 2000b) and Hart (1997), by suggest-
ing that embodied selfhood provides a foun-
dation for an ethics of mutuality. Embodied 
selfhood extends Olthuis’ sensory knowing 
through the articulation of a synthesis of 
bodily and social being. We are embodied, 
complex beings who co-evolve with others 
in the universe. Bringing persons with de-
mentia into this space of embodied co-
evolution deepens and enriches the moral 
imagination and thereby enables possibility 
for relationality and compassionate care. 
Although not yet acknowledged as fully par-
ticipating partners in Olthuis’ (1997, 200b) 
symmetry of mutuality, if difference is the 
space of emergent wisdom, then persons 
with dementia create even more potential 
space and opportunity for developing wis-
dom and for knowing other-wise. A com-
mitment to knowing other-wise, of embrac-
ing dementia as a place of difference and 
space for learning can provide one pathway 
toward a more compassionate, wise, and eth-
ical world. 
 
The places we live and the relationships 
that form there either contribute to and re-
spect our personhood, or they deny our per-
sonhood and inflict suffering of the deepest 
kind. And one further point, for staff who 
work in long term care and who witness the 
suffering imposed by a culture of care that 
objectifies and denies the selfhood of others, 
staff too become depersonalized and dis-
tanced in their work. Work that should be 
about nurturing embodied selfhood and rela-
tionships, becomes work about bodies and 
tasks (Gubrium, 1975; Wiersma & Dupuis, 
2010). 
 
 
Calls for Re-Thinking Complexity  
and Other-Wise 
 
There are gifted scholars and geriatric spe-
cialists who are now questioning the bound-
aries between normal aging and this process 
that medicine has labeled a disease. Peter 
Whitehouse (2008) is one such scholar and 
he has published a controversial book called 
the Myth of Alzheimer’s Disease. Some cul-
tures view dementia as a natural part of the 
life journey (Ikels, 1998). The call for action 
is certainly to ease the pain and unnecessary 
suffering for persons diagnosed with demen-
tia, or any mental illness for that matter. As 
a society we need to be more open, more 
compassionate, more curious about the dif-
ferences that surround us when persons age 
or experience different realities. Instead of 
violating others, we could be learning, and 
growing, and loving others in far more ethi-
cal and compassionate ways. 
 
Transformation of how we care for those 
living with dementia is needed and must 
begin with interrogating and changing the 
language and discourse surrounding demen-
tia. Because of the harm and suffering 
evoked by the current powerful fatalistic and 
destructive discourses, Fazio and his col-
leagues (1999) emphasised the need for pos-
itive alternatives to describe the experience 
of dementia. They emphasized: “As words 
change, so do perceptions, and as percep-
tions change, so do actions” (p. 5). Alterna-
tive discourses challenge what is known and 
provide new possibilities for being and relat-
ing. As Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) not-
ed “To change the culture of our groups (let 
alone whole institutions or society more 
broadly), we must change ourselves, with 
others, through changing the substance, 
forms and patterns of language, activities 
and social relationships which characterize 
groups and interactions among their mem-
bers” (p. 17). 
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Cathie Borrie (2010a, 2010b), an advo-
cate for both people with Alzheimer’s and 
their care partners, herself cared for her 
mother with Alzheimer’s disease for many 
years and wrote about how she came to re-
frame dementia for herself (see Borrie, 
2010a). She became intrigued with her con-
versations with her mother and began to tape 
record their interactions. Although in the 
beginning she saw her mother’s speech as 
garbled talk, nonsense, she began to see the 
poetry in her mother’s words.  
 
In reframing how she saw her mother’s 
words, she learned to be truly present with 
her mother rather than correcting and judg-
ing. In thinking differently about her interac-
tions with her mother she learned to listen 
attentively rather than dismiss. She learned 
that all actions are imbued with meaning and 
are a means of communicating. Her moth-
er’s words became an unexpected gift and 
Cathie has recently published her mother’s 
words so that others can see the poetic and 
celebrate the eccentric realities of dementia 
(see Borrie, 2010b). 
 
I felt free, free and undivided, free as a bird! 
That I done, free and undivided,  
I feel refreshed. 
 Free to flap my arms like a bird. 
    
Go where I want to go. 
Do what I want to do. 
 
We close with an appeal for a more criti-
cal stance toward our practices and dis-
courses. The predominant discourse sur-
rounding dementia is entrenching those di-
agnosed in a cone of violence and fear. We 
need a more critical examination of our pol-
icies and standards and to rebel against those 
that diminish personhood for others and our-
selves. We all need to promote a more curi-
ous and open frame of thinking about aging 
and life with dementia. Recent develop-
ments in understanding complexity concepts, 
relationality, and embodied selfhood can 
inform different ways of thinking, feeling, 
and acting with persons with dementia. Fi-
nally, we need to create language that in-
spires and enables respect, love, creativity, 
and compassionate relating. We need to fill 
in the spaces of knowing other-wise with 
what we come to know when embracing dif-
ference with persons with dementia. 
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